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Abstract
We consider a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing
with incomplete information. In the robust version of the problem the seller only knows
that demand will be in a neighborhood of a given model distribution.
We characterize the optimal pricing policy under two distinct, but related, decision
criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin expected utility and (ii) minimax expected
regret. While the classic monopoly policy and the maximin criterion yield a single deter-
ministic price, minimax regret always prescribes a random pricing policy, or equivalently,
a multi-item menu policy. The resulting optimal pricing policy under either criterion
is robust to the model uncertainty. Finally we derive distinct implications of how a
monopolist responds to an increase in ambiguity under each criterion.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade, the theory of mechanism design has found increasingly widespread
applications in the real world, favored partly by the growth of the electronic marketplace
and trading on the internet. Many trading platforms, such as auctions and exchanges
implement key insights of the theoretical literature. Naturally, with an increase in the use
of optimal design models, the robustness of these mechanisms with respect to the model
speci￿cation becomes an important issue. In this paper, we investigate a robust version
of the classic monopoly problem of selling a product under incomplete information. The
optimal pricing policy is the most elementary instance of a revenue maximizing problem.
We investigate the robustness of the optimal selling policy by enriching the standard
model to account for model ambiguity. Instead of assuming a given demand distribution
from which the buyer is drawn, the seller is only assumed to believe that the demand
distribution will be in the neighborhood of a given model distribution. The enlargement of
the set of possible distributions represents the model ambiguity.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that we can relax the rigid Bayesian
model by considering robust decision making. We maintain a formal approach by building
on axiomatic decision theory and obtain interesting new insights for monopoly pricing. The
methodological insight is that robustness is generated by considering decision making under
multiple priors. We then present rich comparative statics results in terms of the response
of prices to an increase in ambiguity and uncover a novel role for menu pricing. Thus, the
analysis of the robust pricing problem leads to testable hypotheses regarding the behavior
of the seller.
Currently, there are two leading approaches to incorporate multiple priors into axiomatic
decision making: maximin utility and minimax regret. The maximin utility approach with
multiple priors is due to Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989). Here the decision maker evaluates
each action by its minimum expected utility across all priors. The decision maker selects
the action that maximizes the minimum expected utility. The minimax regret approach was
￿rst suggested by Savage (1951) and axiomatized by Milnor (1954). The minimax regret
criterion was recently adapted to multiple priors by Hayashi (2006) and by Stoye (2006).
Here the decision maker takes the maximum of the expected regret as the prior varies and
chooses an action that minimizes the maximum expected regret.
In this paper, we shall analyze the optimal pricing policy under both criteria. We analyze
the optimal policies when the ambiguity is represented by a neighborhood around a given
model distribution. We de￿ne the notion of a neighborhood through the usual metric ofRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 3
weak convergence, the Prohorov metric. In the Prohorov metric two distributions are close
to each other if they permit with large probability small changes in the valuations and with
small probability large changes in the valuations. The analysis of the policies under the
two decision criteria will reveal that either criterion leads to a robust policy in the following
sense. We say that a candidate policy is robust if for any demand su¢ ciently close to the
model distribution the di⁄erence between the expected pro￿t under the optimal policy for
this demand and the expected pro￿t under the candidate policy is arbitrarily small.
While the optimal policies under maximin utility and minimax regret share the robust-
ness property, the response to ambiguity leads to distinct qualitative features. The pricing
policy of the seller is obtained as the equilibrium strategy of a zero-sum game between the
seller and adverserial nature. The strategy by nature selects the least favorable demand
distribution to the objective of the seller. When the decision maker is maximizing the min-
imum expect utility among the class of priors, the least favorable demand is always given
by the distribution which puts maximal weight on the lowest quantiles subject to the re-
striction that the selected distribution is in the neighborhood of the model distribution. As
the objective of nature is to minimize the revenue of the seller, the least favorable demand
is the one which minimizes the potential revenue at any possible price level. In particular
as we increase the ambiguity represented by an increase in the size of the neighborhood,
the least favorable demand increases the weight on the lower quantiles of the distribution.
In consequence the best response of the seller always consists in lowering her price deter-
ministically.
When we analyze the behavior under regret minimization, the optimal pricing policy is
still determined by a zero-sum game between the seller and nature. The notion of regret
modi￿es the trade-o⁄for seller and nature. The regret of the seller is the di⁄erence between
the actual valuation of a buyer for the object and the actual revenue obtained by the seller.
The regret of the seller can therefore be positive for two reasons: (i) a buyer has a low
valuation relative to the price and hence does not purchase the object, or (ii) he has a high
valuation relative to the price and hence the seller could have obtained a higher revenue. In
the equilibrium of the zero-sum game, the optimal pricing policy for the seller has to resolve
the con￿ ict between the regret which arises with low prices against the regret associated
with high prices. If the seller o⁄ers a low price, nature can cause regret with a distribution
which puts substantial probability on high valuation buyers. On the other hand, if the
seller o⁄ers a high price, nature can cause regret with a distribution which puts substantial
probability at valuations just below the o⁄ered price. It then becomes evident that a singleRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 4
price will always expose the seller to substantial regret. Consequently, the seller can decrease
her exposure by o⁄ering many prices. This can either be achieved by a probabilistic price
or, alternatively, by a menu of prices. With a probabilistic price, the seller diminishes the
likelihood that the nature will be able to cause large regret. Equivalently, the seller can o⁄er
a menu of prices and quantities. The quantity element in the menu can either represent a
true quantity in the case of a divisible object or a probability of obtaining the indivisible
object.
The intuition regarding the price policy with regret is easy to establish in comparison
to the revenue maximizing policy for a given distribution. An optimal policy for a given
distribution of valuations is always to o⁄er the entire object at a ￿xed price (a classic result
by Harris & Raviv (1981) and Riley & Zeckhauser (1983)). In contrast, here the policy will
o⁄er many prices (with varying quantities). With a single price, the risk of missing a trade
at a valuation just below the given price is substantial. On the other hand, if the seller
were simply to lower the price, she would miss the chance of extracting revenue from higher
valuation customers. She resolves this con￿ ict by o⁄ering smaller trades at lower prices to
the low valuation customers. The size of the trade is simply the probability by which a trade
is o⁄ered or the quantity o⁄ered at a given price. In the game against nature, the seller will
have to be indi⁄erent between o⁄ering small and large trades. In terms of the virtual utility,
the key notion in optimal mechanisms, this requires that the seller will receive zero virtual
utility over a range of valuations. The resulting conditions on the distribution of valuations
determine the least favorable demand. Importantly, an increase in ambiguity may now lead
to an increase in the expected price. In the special case of linear model distribution we ￿nd
that expected price increases if the optimal price under the model is low and decreases if
the optimal price under the model is high.
From an axiomatic perspective, the maximin and minimax criteria represent di⁄erent
departures from the standard model of Anscome & Aumann (1963). The maximin de-
cision criterion emerges by replacing the independence axiom with the weaker certainty
independence axiom and adding a convexity axiom. Certainty independence requires that
preferences between two given acts remain unchanged when mixing both with some con-
stant act. The minimax regret criterion emerges by maintaining the independence axiom
but relaxing the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is postulated that the
most preferred choice does not change when a new act is added as long as the additional act
does not change the best outcome that can be achieved in each state. The weaker version
holds vacuously in perfect information environment, i.e. when the state is known beforeRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 5
the choice. The convexity axiom and a variation of the betweenness axiom completes the
characterization. Either approach allows to consider sets of distributions. Both maximin
utility and minimax regret criteria do not contradict subjective expected utility theory, and
we may interpret them as alternative axiomatic systems for selecting subjective priors.1
It should be pointed out that while the regret criterion seems to relate to foregone
opportunities when the information is revealed ex post, this particular interpretation is
solely an additional feature of the minimax regret model. Neither the axioms refer to
foregone opportunities nor is it important whether or not ex post additional information
becomes available. As in the case of maximin criterion of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989), the
minimax regret criterion in Hayashi (2006) and Stoye (2006) is completely characterized by
a set of axioms.2
We conclude the introduction with a brief discussion of the directly related literature.
The basic ideas of robust decision making (see De￿nition 1) were ￿rst formalized in the
context of statistical inference, in particular with respect to the classic Neyman-Pearson
hypothesis testing. The statistical problem is to distinguish on the basis of a sample be-
tween two known alternative distributions. The model misspeci￿cation and consequent
concern of robustness comes from the fact that each one of the two distributions might
be misspeci￿ed. Huber (1964), (1965) ￿rst formalized robust estimation as the solution to
a minimax problem and an associated zero-sum game. In the economic context, a recent
article by Prasad (2003) shows that the standard optimal pricing policy is not robust to
small model misspeci￿cations.
A recent paper by Bose, Ozdenoren & Pape (2006) determines the optimal auction in
the presence of an ambiguity averse seller and ambiguity averse bidders. As we consider
the optimal pricing problem the ambiguity aversion of the buyers is immaterial as there
is no strategic interaction across buyers. Lopomo, Rigotti & Shannon (2006) consider a
general mechanism design setting when the agents, but not the principal, have incom-
plete preferences due to Knightian uncertainty. The notion of regret was investigated in
mechanism design by Linhart & Radner (1989) in the context of bilateral trade as well
1Klibano⁄, M.Marinacci & Mukerji (2005) propose a related and smooth model of ambiguity aversion by
enriching the multiple prior model with a belief ￿ over distributions and with an increasing transformation
representing ambiguity aversion. The additional elements, belief ￿ and ambiguity index , render the
analysis of multiple priors richer but also substantially more complex. In addition, the one dimensional
representation of ambiguity in terms of the size of the neighborhood is not available anymore.
2In particular, the axiomatic approach to minimax regret is distinct from the ex-post measure of regret
due to Hannan (1957) in the context of repeated games or to the more behavioral approaches to regret
o⁄ered by Bell (1982) and Loomes & Sugden (1982).Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 6
as by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) and Selten (1989) in the context of auctions. Linhart
& Radner (1989) analyze minimax regret strategies in a bilateral bargaining framework.
In contrast to the incomplete information environment here, the bulk of the analysis in
Linhart & Radner (1989) is concerned with bilateral trade under complete information. In
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) and Selten (1989) the ￿rst and second price sealed bid auc-
tions are analyzed incorporate regret for the bidders. Recently, Engelbrecht-Wiggans &
Katok (2007) and Filiz & Ozbay (2006) present experimental evidence for regret in ￿rst
price auctions.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model,
the notion of robustness and the neighborhoods. In Section 3 we characterize the pricing
policy under the maximin criterion. In Section 4 we characterize the pricing policy under
the minimax criterion. We show that the resulting policies are robust under either criterion.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some open issues. The appendix collects auxiliary
results and the proofs.
2 Model
2.1 Monopoly
A seller o⁄er an object for sale to an unknown demand. The demand is either generated
by a single large buyer or by many small buyers. In the paper we focus on the case of a
single large buyer and later show how the results generalize naturally to the case of many
small buyers. Accordingly, the seller faces a single potential buyer with value v for a unit
of the object. The value v of the object is private information of the buyer and unknown to
the seller. The valuation v of the buyer is an element of the unit interval, v 2 [0;1].3 The
marginal cost of production is constant and normalized to zero. The buyer wishes to buy
at most one unit of the object.
The seller sets a price p; the pro￿t of selling the object at price p if the valuation of the
buyer is v is:
￿ (p;v) , pIfv￿pg;
where Ifv￿pg is the indicator function specifying:
Ifv￿pg =
(
0; if v < p;
1; if v ￿ p:
3More generally, we assume that the value of the buyer is (known by the seller) contained in some closed
interval which we normalize without loss of generality to [0;1].Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 7
In the standard monopoly problem with incomplete information, the seller maximizes the










We denote the probabilistic price that maximizes the pro￿t for given distribution F by
￿￿ (F) so
￿￿ (F) 2 argmax
￿2￿R+
￿ (￿;F).
A well-known result by Riley & Zeckhauser (1983) states that for every distribution F there
exists a deterministic price p￿ that maximizes pro￿ts, so:




In contrast to the standard model of monopoly pricing in which the seller acts as if the
valuation of the buyer is drawn from a (subjective) distribution F, we assume that the
seller faces ambiguity in the sense of Ellsberg (1961). The ambiguity is represented by
a set of possible distributions, where the set is described by a model distribution F0 and
includes all distributions in a neighborhood of size " of the model distribution F0. The
magnitude of the ambiguity is thus quanti￿ed by the size of the neighborhood around the
model distribution.4
Given the model distribution F0 we denote by p0 = p￿ (F0) a pro￿t maximizing price
at F0. For the remainder of the paper we shall assume that (i) p0 is the unique maximizer
of the pro￿t function for the model distribution, (ii) the pro￿t function, ￿ (p;F0) at the
model distribution F0 is strictly concave near p0 and (iii) the density f0 is continuously
4This model of ambiguity permits at least two di⁄erent interpretations. First, the " neighborhood around
the model distribution F0 can be understood as a model with multiple priors. Second, the " neighborhood
can be viewed as an " perturbation of the original model distribution F0. By considering, the larger set of
possible distributions the decision maker is protecting herself against measurment error and/or additional
information which may slightly change the original model. We adopt throughout the ￿rst perspective, but
it related to second perspective, prominent in statistical decision theory.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 8
di⁄erentiable near p0. These regularity assumptions enable us the implicit function theorem
for the local analysis.
We consider two di⁄erent decision criteria that allow for multiple priors: maximin utility
and minimax regret. In either approach, the unknown state of the world is identi￿ed with
the value v of the buyer.
Neighborhoods We describe " neighborhoods of the model distribution F0 (v) by the
Prohorov neighborhood, denoted by P" (F0), and associated metric:
P" (F0) = fF jF (A) ￿ F0 (A") + "; 8A ￿ [0;1]g, (1)
where the set A" denotes the closed " neighborhood of any Borel measurable set A. Formally,











where d(x;y) = jx ￿ yj is the distance on the real line. The Prohorov metric has evidently
two components. The additive term " in (1) allows for a small probability of large changes
in the valuations relative to the model distribution whereas the larger set A" permits large
probabilities of small changes in the valuations. The Prohorov metric is a metric for weak
convergence of probability measures.5






Accordingly, we say that ￿m attains maximin pro￿t. We refer to Fm as a least favorable




so the least favorable demand Fm minimizes pro￿t under the policy ￿:
Minimax Regret The regret of the monopolist at a given price p and valuation v of a
buyer is de￿ned as:
r(p;v) , v ￿ pIfv￿pg = v ￿ ￿ (p;v); (2)
5The Prohorov metric applies to discrete and continuous distributions. In contrast, the Kullback-Leibler
distance only de￿nes neighborhoods for continuous distributions. A related model is the contamination
￿neighborhood￿N" (F0): N" (F0) = fF jF = (1 ￿ ")F0 + "H for some H 2 ￿R+g: Yet the contamination
￿neighborhood￿is not a neighborhood in the sense of the weak topology.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 9
The regret of the monopolist charging price p facing a buyer with value v is the di⁄erence
between (i) the pro￿t the monopolist could make if she were to know the value v of the
buyer before setting her price and (ii) the pro￿t she makes without this information. The
regret is non-negative and can only vanish if p = v. The regret of the monopolist is strictly
positive in either of two cases: (i) the value v exceeds the price p, the indicator function
is then Ifv￿pg = 1; or (ii) the value v is below the price p, the indicator function is then
Ifv￿pg = 0.









Thus, the probabilistic price ￿ is pro￿t maximizing at F if and only if ￿ minimizes (ex-
pected) regret when facing F: The pricing policy ￿r 2 ￿R+ attains minimax regret if it







We refer to Fr as a least favorable demand given the pricing policy ￿ if Fr maximizes regret




The notion of regret naturally extends to the case of many buyers as follows. The
regret of the seller facing n buyers is equal to the sum of the regret accrued over n buyers
and n, possibly distinct, prices. While the seller is thus allowed to o⁄er a di⁄erent price
to each buyer, the additivity of the regret implies that we can con￿ne attention to price
(distributions) which are identical across buyers.7
6The fact that buyer value is contained in some known bounded set provides an upper bound on regret.
If the support of F 2 P" (F0) would not be uniformly bounded then regret would be unbounded on P" (F0)
even if the support of F0 is contained in [0;1]. The neighborhood of the model F0 puts restrictions on
the support. Imposing upper bounds on the willingness to pay are natural once one thinks about realistic
applications.
7Alternatively we could restrict the seller to o⁄er the same price to all buyers. The present analysis of
the single buyer then generalizes after imposing only that the marginal distribution of each buyer belongs
to P" (F0): The least favorable demand will then involve all buyers realizing the same valuation.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 10
2.3 Robust Pricing Policy
For a given model distribution F0 we identify a price policy as a class of probabilistic prices
f￿"g dependent on the size of the neighborhood ".
De￿nition 1 (Robust Pricing Policy)
A pricing policy f￿"g is called robust if for each ￿ > 0 there is " > 0 such that:
F 2 P" (F0) ) ￿ (￿￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (￿";F) < ￿:
The above notion presents a formal criterion of robust decision making in the spirit of
the statistical decision literature pioneered by Huber (1964). The robust policy is allowed
to depend on the size " of the neighborhood.8 In contrast to minimax regret where pro￿ts
are compared to best choices ex-post, robustness involves comparing expected pro￿ts to
those attainable ex-ante when the valuation is drawn from a known distribution.
In the context of optimal monopoly pricing Prasad (2003) shows that the optimal policy
is not robust if F0 is a Dirac distribution. For a given model distribution F0, there are
potentially many robust pricing rules. Our objective is to select among these rules by
considering decision making under multiple priors and then to show that the resulting
pricing rules are robust in the above sense of statistical decision making.
3 Maximin Pro￿t
We consider the problem of the monopolist who wishes to maximize the minimum pro￿t for
all distribution in the neighborhood of the model distribution F0. Following Neumann &
Morgenstern (1953), the maximin pricing rule and the least favorable demand can be viewed
as the equilibrium strategies of a game between the seller and adverserial nature (provided
such an equilibrium exists). The seller chooses a probabilistic price ￿ and nature chooses
a demand distribution F from the set P" (F0). In this game the payo⁄ of the seller is the
expected pro￿t while the payo⁄ of nature is the negative if the expected pro￿t. Formally,
a Nash equilibrium of this zero-sum game can be characterized as a solution to the saddle
point problem of ￿nding (￿m;Fm) that satisfy:
￿ (￿;Fm) ￿ ￿ (￿m;Fm) ￿ ￿ (￿m;F); 8￿ 2 ￿R+, 8F 2 P" (F0). (SPm)
8The recent literature on robust decision making in macroeconomics, see Hansen & Sargent (2004) for a
survey, uses the same notion of robustness for maximizing the minimum utility in intertemporal decision-
making.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 11
In other words, at (￿m;Fm) the probabilistic price ￿m is pro￿t maximizing at Fm and Fm
is a least favorable demand given ￿m.
The objective of adverserial nature is to lower the expected revenue of the seller. For
a given price p o⁄ered by the seller, the least favorable demand is achieved by increasing
the cumulative probability of valuations strictly below v as much as possible given the
neighborhood. The least favorable demand then minimizes the probability of sale by the
seller. Given the model distribution F0 and the size " of the neighborhood the resulting
distribution is uniquely determined for every p. The equilibrium analysis is now simpli￿ed
by the fact that the least favorable demand does not depend on the probabilistic price of
the seller. The least favorable demand is thus achieved by shifting the probabilities as far
down as possible.
The construction of a least favorable distribution in the Prohorov metric is rather trans-
parent. Given a model demand F0 and a neighborhood size ", we shift for every v the
cumulative probability of the model distribution F0 at the point v +" downwards to be the
cumulative probability at the point v. In addition, we transfer the very highest valuations
with probability " to the lowest valuation, namely v = 0: This results in the distribution
Fm that is within the " neighborhood of F0 with Fm given by:
Fm (v) , minfF0 (v + ") + ";1g: (4)
The ￿rst shift represents the possibility that small changes in valuations may occur with
large probability, whereas the second shift represents the idea of large changes with a small
probability.
Given that the demand Fm that minimizes pro￿ts does not depend on the o⁄ered prices,
the monopolist acts as if the demand given by Fm. In consequence, the seller maximizes
pro￿ts at Fm by choosing a deterministic price pm where pm = p￿ (Fm).
Proposition 1 (Maximin Pro￿t)
For every " > 0; there exists a pair (pm;Fm) such that pm attains maximin pro￿t and Fm
is a least favorable demand.
It is then natural to ask how the optimal price will change with an increase in ambiguity.
The rate of the change in the price depends on the curvature of the pro￿t function at the
model distribution. By the earlier assumption of concavity, we know that the curvature is
negative and given by:
@2￿ (p0;F0)
@p2 = ￿2f0 (p0) ￿ p0f0
0 (p0) < 0:Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 12
We can directly apply the implicit function theorem to the optimal price p0 at the model
distribution F0 and have the following comparative static result.
Proposition 2 (Pricing under Maximin Pro￿t)









1 ￿ f0 (p0)




Accordingly, the maximin price responds to an increase in ambiguity with a lower price.
Marginally this response is equal to ￿1 if the objective function is in￿nitely concave. As
the pro￿t function becomes less concave, the rate of the price change increases as the pro￿t
function of the seller becomes less sensitive to a (downward) change in price and a more
aggressive response of the seller diminishes the impact that the least favorable demand has
on sales of the monopolist.
Consider now the pro￿ts attained by the maximin price pm when facing some distribution
F within the neighborhood of the model F0. These pro￿ts will be at least as high as those
obtained when facing the least favorable demand Fm as the least favorable demand involves
maximally decreasing all values within the neighborhood of the model. As we show that
optimal pro￿ts when facing a known distribution are continuous in this distribution this
means that pro￿ts achieved by pm when facing F are close to those achieved by p￿ (F) when
facing F: The maximin pricing rule thus quali￿es as robust pricing rule.
Proposition 3
The pricing policy fp"
mg consisting of the maximin prices is a robust policy.
4 Minimax Regret
4.1 Probabilistic Pricing
Next we consider the minimax regret problem of the seller. Analogous to case of maximin
above, the minimax regret strategy ￿r and the least favorable demand Fr are the equilibrium
policies of a zero-sum game (provided such an equilibrium exists). In this zero-sum game
the payo⁄of the seller is the negative of the regret while the payo⁄to nature is regret itself.
That is, (￿r;Fr) can be characterized as a solution to the saddle point problem of ￿nding
(￿r;Fr) that satisfy:
r(￿r;F) ￿ r(￿r;Fr) ￿ r(￿;Fr); 8￿ 2 ￿R+, 8F 2 P" (F0). (SPr)Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 13
The saddlepoint result permits us to link minimax regret behavior to payo⁄maximizing
behavior under a prior as follows. When minimax regret is derived from the equilibrium
characterization in (SPr) then any price chosen by a monopolist who minimizes maximal
regret, is at the same time a price which maximizes expected pro￿t against a particular
demand, namely the least favorable demand. In fact, the saddle point condition requires
that ￿r is a probabilistic price that maximizes pro￿ts given Fr and Fr is a least favorable
demand given ￿r:
In the equilibrium of the zero-sum game, the probabilistic price has to resolve the con￿ ict
between the regret which arises with low prices against the regret associated with high prices.
The regret of the seller depends critically on the price o⁄ered by the seller. If she o⁄ers
a low price, nature can cause regret with a distribution which puts substantial probability
on high valuation buyers. On the other hand, if she o⁄ers a high price, nature can cause
regret with a distribution which puts substantial probability at valuations just below the
o⁄ered price. It now becomes evident that a single price will always expose the seller to
substantial regret. Conversely, the least favorable demand will now typically depend on the
price o⁄ered by the seller. In fact, the seller can decrease her exposure by o⁄ering many
prices in form of a probabilistic price. In contrast to the maximin pro￿t, the least favorable
demand is the result of an equilibrium argument and cannot be constructed independently
of the strategy of the seller. We shall prove the existence of a solution to the saddlepoint
problem (SPr) and thus existence of a probabilistic price attaining minimax regret using
results from Reny (1999).
Proposition 4 (Existence of Minimax Regret)
A solution (￿r;Fr) to the saddlepoint condition (SPr) exists.
The minimax regret probabilistic price of the seller has to respond to a set of possible
distributions. With an adversarial nature, the minimax regret policy of the seller is to o⁄er
many prices. We might guess intuitively that even the lowest price o⁄ered by the seller is
not very far away from p0, the optimal price for the model distribution. In consequence,
the price might not be low enough to dissuade nature from ￿undercutting￿ by placing
probability just below the lowest price o⁄ered by the seller. This in turn might suggest
that an equilibrium of the minimax regret pricing game fails to exist, however contradicting
Proposition 4 above. Equilibrium strategies will be established by using the constraints on
the least favorable demand. Naturally, the seller will price close to the optimal price without
ambiguity. A mass point in the pricing strategy of the seller will be placed precisely at theRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 14
point where nature is constrained by the neighborhood to shift any additional probability
from above to just below the mass point of the seller. The seller then places the remaining
mass in a neighborhood [a;c] of this mass point b to protect against an increase in regret
through local increases in values near to this mass point.
Proposition 5 (Minimax Regret)




> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 if 0 ￿ p < a
ln
p
a if a ￿ p < b
1 ￿ ln c
p if b ￿ p ￿ c
1 if c < p ￿ 1
.
2. The boundary points a;b and c satisfy 0 < a < b < c < 1 and a < p0 < c:
3. The boundary points a;b and c respond to an increase in ambiguity at " = 0 as follows:
(a) lim"!0 a0 (") = ￿1;






(c) lim"!0 c0 (") = 1:
We construct the minimax regret probabilistic price by means of the implicit function
theorem, for which we need the di⁄erentiability of the density function near p0. The least
favorable demand makes the seller indi⁄erent among all prices p 2 [a;c]. To protect against
nature either undercutting or moving mass to highest possible prices the interval over which
the seller randomizes increases substantially as ambiguity increases. On the other hand,
the mass point remains close as ambiguity increases.
We now illustrate the equilibrium behavior with the uniform model distribution:
F0 (v) = v;
where the pro￿t maximizing price p0 under the model distribution is given by p0 = 1
2: We
graphically represent the optimal behavior of the seller and nature for a small neighborhood.
Insert Figure 1: Minimax Pricing and Worst Case DemandRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 15
The interior curve in the above graph identi￿es the model distribution. Constraints
induced by small changes in values cause the distribution function of Fr to be within an "
bandwidth of the model distribution. The large changes of values, occurring with probability
of at most " move the smallest valuation to the largest valuation, namely 1. The strategy of
nature is then to place as little probability as necessary below the range of the prices o⁄ered
by the seller and to shift values above the range as high as possible. Inside the range of
prices o⁄ered by the seller, nature uses a density function which maintains the virtual utility
of the seller at 0. In turn, the seller sets the density to make nature indi⁄erent between all
values above the mass point and all values below the mass point. Given the mass point set
by the seller, nature shifts as much mass as possible below this point. We observe that even
with the small neighborhood of " = 0:04, the impact of the ambiguity on the probabilistic
price is rather large and leads to a wide spread in the prices o⁄ered by the seller.
It remains to describe the comparative static of the probabilistic price and the regret
of the seller as a function of the size of the neighborhood. The behavior of regret and the
expected price to a marginal increase in ambiguity can be explained by the ￿rst order e⁄ects.
For a small level of ambiguity, we may represent the regret through a linear approximation




where r0 is the regret at the model distribution. For a small level of ambiguity, the marginal
change in regret can then be computed by holding the probabilistic price of the seller at
the optimal price p0 without ambiguity. Suppose then for the moment that p0 ￿ 1
2: If the
ambiguity increases marginally, the constraints on the choice of a least favorable demand
are relaxed. What precisely then can nature do given the speci￿cation of neighborhood.
First nature can place the density f0 (p0) slightly below p0 to marginally increase regret
by p0f0 (p0), then nature can shift each value up by " to marginally increase regret by 1
and ￿nally shift mass from 0 to 1 to marginally increase regret by 1 ￿ p0: The ￿rst two
changes correspond to small changes in valuation with large probability, the third to large
changes in the valuation with small probability. So the overall marginal e⁄ect on regret of
an increase in " near " = 0 is:
p0f0 (p0) + 1 + (1 ￿ p0):
If instead the optimal price without ambiguity would be p0 > 1
2, then the only modi￿cation
would a⁄ect the third element as nature would move mass from 0 to just below p0, so that
the marginal increase would be
p0f0 (p0) + 1 + p0.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 16
The optimal response of the seller to an increase in ambiguity is now to ￿nd a probabilistic




coming from the increase in ambiguity. Of course, the cost of adjusting the price to minimize
the marginal regret is that it changes the regret relative to the model distribution F0.
Locally, the cost of moving the price away from the optimum is given by the second derivative
of the objective function. With small ambiguity, the curvature of the regret is identical to
the curvature of the pro￿t function. The rate at which the minimax regret price responses
to an increase in ambiguity is then simply the ratio of the response of the marginal regret












The next proposition shows that the above intuition can be made precise and shows its
implication for the net utility of the buyer.
Proposition 6 (Comparative Statics with Minimax Regret)














2 if p0 > 1
2
. (5)
We observe that for p0 > 1
2, the response of the expected price E[pr] to an increase in
ambiguity is identical under regret minimization and pro￿t maximization. The di⁄erence
arises at a low level of p0 at which the seller is less aggressive in lowering her price due to
an increase in ambiguity. As an implication from Proposition 6, we ￿nd that in the class
of linear densities the change in expected price as well as the change in the mass point is
strictly positive if and only if the density is strictly decreasing. This has to be contrasted
with the maximin behavior where any increase in size of the ambiguity has a downward
e⁄ect on prices for all model distributions.
4.2 Menu Pricing
So far, our analysis assumed that the seller can only o⁄er an indivisible object at some price
p. We now extend the instruments of the seller and allow her to o⁄er a menu of items. TheRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 17
equilibrium policies with menus rather than single prices can be directly derived from the
random pricing policies studied earlier and thus little new analysis will be necessary. The
equilibrium use of menus allows us to understand the selling policies from a di⁄erent and
perhaps more intuitive point of view. The optimality of menus also emphasizes the role
of robustness concerns in the optimal selling policies as menus would never be used in the
standard setting for a given demand distribution.
If the allocative decision regards an indivisible object, or x 2 f0;1g, then a speci￿c item
on the menu assigns a probability of receiving the object at a corresponding price. If on the
other hand, the allocative decision regards a continuous variable, or x 2 [0;1], then a menu
o⁄ers a variety of quantities at di⁄erent prices. We observe that with the multiplicative
utility v ￿ x used here, the notions of probability and quantity are mathematically inter-
changeable. In a direct mechanism, a menu is a pair (x(v);p(v)) which maps a reported
type v into a quantity x(v) and price p(v). We transform an equilibrium probabilistic price
into a menu policy by de￿ning the quantity assigned in the direct mechanism through:
xr (v) , ￿￿
r (v); (6)





By standard arguments recorded in Lemma 2 in the appendix this assignment of quantities
to values de￿nes an incentive compatible mechanism.
Form the point of view of menus, the minimax regret menu o⁄ered by seller then has
three important characteristics. These properties can be described with reference to the
mass point b: (i) low volume o⁄ers are made for buyers with low valuations, or v < b,
(ii) a much higher o⁄er is made for all buyers with valuation v = b, and (iii) even higher
volume o⁄ers are made to buyers with large values v > b. We may think of a standard o⁄er
given by the quantity o⁄ered at v = b, and given by x￿ (b). In addition, the seller o⁄ers
low volume downgrades and high volume upgrades. The expanded menu relative to the
optimal single item menu for the model distribution seeks to minimize the exposure of the
seller. Obviously, the seller looses pro￿ts on the high value buyers from making o⁄ers to
the low value buyers by granting the high value buyers a larger information rent. The size
of the information rent is kept small by o⁄ering menu items to the low value buyers only
of substantially lower volume. This is the source of the gap in the quantities o⁄ered in the
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A natural comparison to a minimax regret decision maker is a risk averse decision
maker. In particular, we could ask how the behavior of a risk averse seller would di⁄er
from the behavior of a minimax regret seller. Clearly, a risk averse seller would never ￿nd
a probabilistic price optimal. However, if she can o⁄er lotteries or if the good is divisible
then a risk averse seller might indeed o⁄er a menu. The menu would consist of a set of
possible quantity and price combinations. The di⁄erence with respect to the minimax regret
seller would then be in the shape of the menu. In particular, if a risk averse seller were
to face a continuous demand function (as expressed by F0), then the optimal menu can be
shown to be continuous. Yet, with a minimax regret seller, we saw that the optimal menu is
discontinuous (at a single jump point) and essentially o⁄ers two (or three) classes of distinct
service.
The minimax regret problems with ambiguity then o⁄ers an interesting and novel reason
for menus. Despite the prevalence of menus, the literature currently o⁄ers only two leading
explanations for menus in the standard monopoly setting: menus can be optimal if the
marginal willingness to pay changes with the quantity o⁄ered as in Deneckere & McAfee
(1996) or if the buyers are budget constrained as in Che & Gale (2000).
The minimax regret response of the seller to an increase in ambiguity is perhaps even
more informative when we consider menus. In a menu, the seller is o⁄ering many di⁄erent
choices to the buyers. An immediate question therefore is how the choice set for the buyers
changes with an increase in the ambiguity. We de￿ne the size of the menu simply as the
range of quantities o⁄ered by the seller (and accepted by some buyers) in equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (Menus and Ambiguity)
For small ambiguity:
1. The size of the menu is increasing in ":
2. The price per unit p￿
r (v)=x￿
r (v) is decreasing in ".
As the ambiguity increases, the seller seeks to minimize her exposure by o⁄ering more
choices to the buyers and hence increasing the probability of a sale, even if the sale is not
￿big￿in terms of the sold quantity. For every given valuation v, the seller also increases
the size of the deal o⁄ered. As larger deals are o⁄ered to buyers with lower valuations, it
follows that the seller is willing to concede a larger information rent to buyers with higher
valuations. In consequence, the average price per unit is decreasing as well. Jointly, these
three properties imply that the seller is o⁄ering her products more aggressively and to aRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 19
larger number of buyers with an increase in ambiguity. We observe that the monotonicity
in the unit price holds even as the previous proposition showed that the expected price may
be increasing. The resolution of this apparent con￿ ict comes from the fact that the seller
is o⁄ering larger quantities in response to an increase an ambiguity.
4.3 Robustness
We conclude this section by showing that the solution to the minimax regret problem also
generates a robust policy in the sense of De￿nition 1.
Proposition 8 (Robustness)
If ￿r attains minimax regret at F0 for all su¢ ciently small " then f￿"
rg is robust at F0:
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed robust pricing policies by a monopolist. We introduced robustness
by allowing for multiple priors in the neighborhood of a model distribution. We analyzed
the optimal pricing of a monopolist under two distinct, but related decision criteria with
multiple priors: maximin pro￿t and minimax regret. We showed that the solution under
either criterion yields a robust solution in the statistical sense. The expected revenue under
either pricing rule is arbitrarily close to the optimal price for any distribution in a su¢ ciently
small neighborhood of the model distribution. Despite the common robustness property,
the prices respond di⁄erently to the ambiguity. The maximin policy uniformly maintains
a deterministic price policy and uniformly lowers the price by an increase in ambiguity. In
contrast, the minimax policy balances the downside versus the upside when responding to
the ambiguity. Here the trade-o⁄is optimally resolved by a probabilistic price. Importantly,
the expected price does not necessarily decrease with an increase in ambiguity. Interestingly,
an equivalent policy to the probabilistic price is achieved by a menu. The menu o⁄ers a
variety of quantities, ranging from small to large quantities to the buyer. By o⁄ering a
menu, the seller can guarantee himself small deals on the downside and large deals on the
upside. In consequence, the seller hedges to reduce maximal regret by o⁄ering multiple
choices through a menu.
The problem of optimal monopoly pricing is in many respects the most elementary
mechanism design problem. It would be of interest to extend the insights and apply the
techniques developed here to a wide class of design problems, such as the discriminating
monopolist (as in Mussa & Rosen (1978) and Maskin & Riley (1984)) and optimal auctions.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 20
The monopoly setting has the simplifying feature that the buyers have complete information
about their payo⁄ environment. Given their known valuation and known price, each buyer
simply had to make a decision as to whether or not to purchase the object. With the
complete information by the buyer, there was no need to look for a robust purchasing rules.
A substantial task would consequently arise by considering multi-agent design problems with
incomplete information such as auctions, where it becomes desirable to ￿robustify￿both the
decisions of the buyers and the seller. The recent result by Segal (2003) and Chung & Ely
(2003) regarding the su¢ cient conditions for the existence of dominant strategies for the
bidders in optimal auctions might o⁄er a ￿rst step in this direction. The complete solution
of these problems poses a rich ￿eld for future research.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 21
6 Appendix
The appendix contains some auxiliary results and the proofs for the results in the main
body of the text.
Proof of Proposition 1. As shown in the text, if Fm is such that
Fm (v) = minfF0 (v + ") + ";1g,
then ￿ (p;Fm) ￿ ￿ (p;F) for all F 2 P" (F0): On the other hand, if pm = p￿ (Fm) then
￿ (pm;Fm) ￿ ￿ (p;Fm) holds for all p by de￿nition of pm: Together this implies that (pm;Fm)
is a saddle point as described in (SPm) and thus pm attains maximin payo⁄ and Fm is a
least favorable demand given pm. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. For su¢ ciently small " our assumptions on F0 imply that Fm is
di⁄erentiable near pm: Since pm is optimal given demand Fm we ￿nd that pm satis￿es the
associated ￿rst order conditions
d
dp
(p(1 ￿ Fm (p)))jp=pm = 0:
The earlier concavity assumptions on F0 imply that we can apply the implicit function
theorem at " = 0 and this yields the statement to be proven. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that for any ￿ > 0 there exists " > 0 such that
F 2 P" (F0) implies ￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (pm;F) < ￿: Note that ￿ (pm;F) ￿ ￿ (pm;Fm) and
thus
￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (pm;F) ￿ ￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ ￿ (pm;Fm):
Since pm = p￿ (Fm) the proof is complete once we show that ￿ (p￿ (F);F) is a continuous
function of F with respect to the Prohorov neighborhood. Consider F; b Fv such that b Fv 2
P" (F): Using the fact that












p￿ (F) ￿ "; b Fv
￿
= (p￿ (F) ￿ ")
￿
1 ￿ b Fv (p￿ (F) ￿ ")
￿
￿ (p￿ (F) ￿ ")(1 ￿ F (p￿ (F)) ￿ ") ￿ ￿ (p￿ (F);F) ￿ 2":




, it follows that
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and hence we have proven that ￿ (p￿ (F);F) is continuous in F. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. We apply Corollary 5.2 in Reny (1999) to show that a saddle
point exists. For this we need to verify that the zero-sum game between the seller and
nature is a compact Hausdor⁄ game for which the mixed extension is both reciprocally
upper semi continuous and payo⁄ secure.
Clearly we have a compact Hausdor⁄ game. Reciprocal upper semi continuity follows
directly as we are investigating a zero-sum game. So all we have to ensure is payo⁄security.
Payo⁄ security for the monopolist means that we have to show for each (Fr;￿r) with





￿ r(￿r;Fr) + ￿:
Let ￿ , ￿=4 and let ￿ be such that ￿(p) , ￿r (p + ￿): Then using the fact that
F (v) ￿ Fr (v ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ we obtain
Z 1
0















￿ r(￿r;Fr) + ￿:
To show payo⁄ security for nature we have to show for each (￿r;Fr) with Fr 2 P" (F0) and





￿ r(￿r;Fr) ￿ ￿:
Here we set F , Fr: Given ￿ > 0 consider any ￿ 2 P￿ (￿r). All we have to show is that
￿ (￿;Fr) ￿ ￿ (￿r;Fr) + ￿ for su¢ ciently small ￿: Note that ￿(p) ￿ ￿r (p + ￿) + ￿ implies



























Given continuity of Z Z
[p￿￿;p)
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in ￿ the claim is established. ￿
In order to derive the equilibrium policies in the case of small ambiguity we present a
characterization of the Prohorov distance in Lemma 1 that builds on the following result of
Strassen (1965).
Theorem (Strassen (1965)).
F and G have Prohorov distance less than or equal to " if and only if there exist random vari-
ables X and Y such that X has distribution F; Y has distribution G and Pr(jY ￿ Xj ￿ ") ￿
1 ￿ ".
The two cumulative distributions F;G are close if and only if they are associated to two
random variables that realize similar values with high probability. Our characterization
describes the Prohorov distance in terms of cumulative distribution functions only. In order
to stay within " distance of a given distribution function G one may ￿rst alter any value
by at most ", this creates a probability measure F1, and then move at most " mass of the
values. The new locations are described by a measure F2 while locations from where mass
has been taken is described by a measure F3.
Lemma 1 (Decomposition)
Consider " > 0 and probability measures F and G. F 2 P" (G) if and only if there exists a
probability measure F1 and positive additive measures F2 and F3 such that:
G(x ￿ ") ￿ F1 (x) ￿ G(x + "); F2;F3 ￿ ";
and
F ￿ F1 + F2 ￿ F3:
Proof. (() Suppose F can be decomposed into F1;F2 and F3. We want to show that
F (A) ￿ G(A")+". To this purpose, it is clearly su¢ cient su¢ cient to consider only closed
sets A.
(a) We ￿rst prove the claim for A = [x;y] with 0 ￿ x ￿ y ￿ 1: Given a probability
measure H let H￿ (b v) , limv"b v H (v): Then
F1 ([x;y]) = F1 (y) ￿ F￿
1 (x) ￿ G(y + ") ￿ G￿ (x ￿ ") = G([x;y]
"):
Since F2 ([x;y]) ￿ " and F3 ([x;y]) ￿ 0 we obtain:
F ([x;y]) = F1 ([x;y]) + F2 ([x;y]) ￿ F3 ([x;y]) ￿ G([x;y]
") + ":Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 24




Using part (a) together with the fact that A" = [x1;y1]
"[[x2;y2]
" holds for the [￿]
" operator,
it follows that:
F1 (A) = F1 ([x1;y1]) + F1 ([x2;y2]) ￿ G([x1;y1]
") + G([x2;y2]
") = G(A"):
Since F2 (A) ￿ " and F3 (A) ￿ 0, the claim is proven.
(c) The arguments in part (b) are easily generalized for any set A that can be decomposed
into a ￿nite union of disjoint closed intervals of distance greater than 2" so A = [m
k=1 [xk;yk]
with xk ￿ yk < xk+1 + 2" for k ￿ m ￿ 1:
(d) Finally we show that we do not have to prove the statement for more general sets A.
Notice that if A"
1 = A"
2; A1 ￿ A2 and F (A2) ￿ G(A"
2)+" then F (A1) ￿ G(A"
1)+": So we
can restrict attention to proving the claim for closed sets A such that A" = A"
1 and A ￿ A1
implies A = A1: Consider x;y 2 A such that x < y ￿ x + 2": Then fA [ [x;y]g
" = A" and
hence [x;y] ￿ A: It follows that A belongs to the class of sets investigated in part (c).
()) Consider probability measures F and G with kF ￿ Gk ￿ ": We extend G to
[￿";1 + "] such that G(x) = 0 for ￿" ￿ x < 0 and G(x) = 1 for 1 < x ￿ 1 + ":
Given the result of Strassen (1965), there exist random variables X and Y such that X has
distribution F; Y has distribution G and Pr(jY ￿ Xj ￿ ") ￿ 1 ￿ ".
Let Z1 be the random variable with cdf F1 such that Z1 , X if jY ￿ Xj ￿ " and Z1 , Y
if jY ￿ Xj > ". Let "0 , Pr(jY ￿ Xj > ") so "0 ￿ ": Then G(x ￿ ") ￿ F1 (x) ￿ G(x + "):
Let Z2 be the random variable with cdf b F2 such that Z2 , 0 if jY ￿ Xj ￿ " and Z2 , X if
jY ￿ Xj > ": Let Z3 be the random variable with cdf b F3 such that Z3 , 0 if jY ￿ Xj ￿ "
and Z3 , Y if jY ￿ Xj > ": Then X = Z1 + Z2 ￿ Z3 and b F2 (0); b F3 (0) ￿ 1 ￿ "0: Let
Fi , b Fi￿(1 ￿ "0) for i = 2;3: Then F2 and F3 are positive additive measures with F2;F3 ￿ "0
and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by assuming p0 > 1
2: The proof proceeds in three steps.
First we show the existence of the parameters a; b and c and use these to construct the least
favorable demand Fr: Second, we decompose the least favorable demand by using Lemma
1 to show that it is close to F0: Third we use this decomposition to verify that we have a
saddle point.
Step 1. We start by showing that for su¢ ciently small " there exist parameters a;b;cRobust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 25
such that a < b < c and a < p0 < c such that
F0 (a ￿ ") ￿ " = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
a
; (8)
F0 (b + ") = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
b
; (9)
F0 (c ￿ ") = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
c
: (10)
With respect to the existence of b; note that b = p0 solves (9) if " = 0. As
d
db
(1 ￿ F0 (b + ") ￿ bf0 (b + "))j"=0 = ￿2f (p0) ￿ p0 (f0)
0 (p0) < 0;
due to the strict concavity of pro￿ts at p0, the implicit function theorem implies that a
solution b = b(") to (9) (with b > 0) exists for " in a neighborhood of 0. To prove existence
of c; de￿ne
h(v) , 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
v
￿ F0 (v ￿ ") for v > 0:
Then h(b) = F0 (b + ") ￿ F0 (b ￿ ") with
h0 (b) = f0 (b + ") ￿ f0 (b ￿ ");
and
h00 (b) = ￿
2f0 (b + ")
b
￿ (f0)
0 (b ￿ ") ￿ ￿




We note that h(b) > 0 by our earlier concavity assumptions on F0: Looking at the Taylor
approximation of h near v = b for small " we obtain that there exists c > b such that
h(c) = 0 with c ! p0 as " ! 0: As for the existence of a; analogous calculations for h(v)+"
show that there exists a < b such that h(a) + " = 0 with a ! p0 as " ! 0:
We can describe the local behavior of the parameters a;b and c by appealing to the
implicit function theorem. Since 2f0 (p0)+p0 (f0)
0 (p0) > 0 we know that b is di⁄erentiable
and by implicitly di⁄erentiating (9) we obtain:
b0 (0) = ￿
f0 (p0) + p0 (f0)
0 (p0)




2f0 (p0) + p0 (f0)
0 (p0)
(11)
where ￿1 ￿ b0 (0) ￿ ￿1=2: Next we show that a is di⁄erentiable. Since
b2f0 (b + ") ￿ a2f0 (a ￿ ")
b ￿ a
= (b + a)f0 (b + ") + a2f0 (b + ") ￿ f0 (a ￿ ")
b ￿ a
￿ 2p0f0 (p0) + (p0)
2 (f0)
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we ￿nd that b2f0 (b + ") > a2f0 (a ￿ ") near " = 0. Hence we can implicitly di⁄erentiate (8)
to obtain
a0 (") = ￿a
a + af0 (a ￿ ") + bf0 (b + ")







a0 (") = ￿
1 + 2f0 (p0)
2f0 (p0) + p0 (f0)
0 (p0)
:
In particular we obtain that
lim
"!0
a0 (") = ￿1: (13)
Similarly for c, we ￿nd that:
c0 (") = ￿c
cf0 (c ￿ ") + bf0 (b + ")


















c0 (") = 1: (15)
It now follows from (13) and (15) that a < p0 < c.
Step 2. We now construct the least favorable demand on the basis of a;b and c.
Consider Fr given by
Fr (v) ,
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
maxf0;F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g, if v 2 [0;a]
1 ￿
b2f0(b+")
v , if v 2 (a;c)
F0 (v ￿ "), if v 2 [c;1)
1 if v = 1
,
where the de￿nitions of a and c imply that Fr is continuous at a and c. It follows that Fr
is a probability measure.





F0 (v ￿ "), if v 2 [0;a]
maxfFr (v);F0 (v ￿ ")g, if v 2 (a;b)
Fr (v); if v 2 [b;1]
.
Then F1 is a probability measure with F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ F1 (v): By de￿nition of b we obtain
Fr (b) = F0 (b + ") and F0
r (b) = d
dvF0 (v + ")jv=b: Moreover, given F00




dv2F0 (v + ") = (f0)
0 (v + "), strict concavity of pro￿ts near p0 implies that F00
0 (v) < F00
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for v 2 [a;c] and " su¢ ciently small. Thus, for su¢ ciently small "; as a and c are close to
p0; we obtain F1 (v) ￿ F0 (v + ") with equality if v = b: So F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ F1 (v) ￿ F0 (v + ").





0, if v 2 [0;a]
" ￿ maxfF0 (v ￿ ") ￿ Fr (v);0g, if v 2 (a;b]





(Fr (v) ￿ F0 (v + ")) =
b2f0 (b + ")





v2f0 (v + ")
￿
= v2 (f0)
0 (v + ") + 2vf0 (v + ") > 0;
holds for " su¢ ciently small and hence F2 is weakly increasing with F2 (1) = ": Since F2 is
also right continuous we obtain that F2 is an additive probability measure.
Let F3 be de￿ned by
F3 (v) , minfF0 (v ￿ ");"g; if v 2 [0;1];
so F3 (v) is an additive probability measure and F3 (1) = ": Since Fr = F1 + F2 ￿ F3 we
obtain from Lemma 1 that Fr 2 P" (F0):
Step 3. Next we show that (Gr;Fr) is a saddle point. For the monopolist we verify
easily that ￿ (p;Fr) = b2f0 (b + ") for p 2 [a;c]: Similar to the calculations following the
de￿nition of F1 it is easily shown that there exists ￿ > 0 such that 1￿
b2f0(b+")
v < Fr (v) holds
for all v 2 [p0 ￿ ￿;p0 + ￿]n[a;c] and all su¢ ciently small ": Thus, for su¢ ciently small "
we obtain [a;c] = argmaxp2[p0￿￿;p0+￿] ￿ (p;Fr) and together with the upperhemicontinuity
of pro￿ts that [a;c] ￿ argmaxp ￿ (p;Fr).
Consider now the incentives of nature. Note that
r(Gr;Fr) = r(Gr;F1) + r(Gr;F2) ￿ r(Gr;F3); (16)
where we choose F2 and F3 such that F2 (1) = F3 (1) = ": In the following we show that
each term in (16) is maximized separately: If nature could put all mass on a single value
v, by construction of Fr nature would be indi⁄erent over v 2 [a;b) and over v 2 [b;c]:
Since r(Gr;v) is monotone increasing on [0;a] and [c;1] it follows that argmaxv r(Gr;v) ￿
[a;b) [ f1g: For su¢ ciently small "; r(Gr;a) ￿ p0 while r(Gr;1) ￿ 1 ￿ p0 and thus given
p0 > 1
2 we obtain [a;b) = argmaxv r(Gr;v):Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 28
Concerning F3 let v = inf fv : F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g: We have to show that r(Gr;e v) ￿ r(Gr;b v)
for e v ￿ v ￿ b v: Given the above it is su¢ cient to consider only e v = v and b v = c where
r(Gr;c) = c ￿ E(pr): Let ￿ , 2supv>0
v
F0(v). For v su¢ ciently small, ￿ ￿ v
F0(v) and hence
r(Gr;e v) = e v ￿ " + ￿F0 (e v ￿ ") = "(1 + ￿): On the other hand, we showed in Step 1 that
@
@"cj"=0 = 1 and in the proof of Proposition 6 based only on arguments in Step 1 that
@
@"E(pr)j"=0 < 1 so @
@"r(Gr;c)j"=0 = 1. Hence, r(Gr;e v) < r(Gr;c) for " su¢ ciently
small.
Finally, consider F1: More mass cannot be allocated to regret maximizing values [a;b) as
F1 (b) = F0 (b + "); weight on values below a and above c are shifted up as far as possible as
Fv (v) = F0 (v ￿ ") for v < a and c < v < 1 and allocation of F1 for F1 2 (F1 (b);F0 (c ￿ "))
will not in￿ uence regret as r(Gr;v) is constant on [b;c]:
The case of p0 ￿ 1
2 proceeds in an analogous manner. It is easily shown that there exist
parameters a;b;c such that a < b < c and a < p0 < c such that
F0 (a ￿ ") ￿ " = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
a
;
F0 (b + ") = 1 ￿
b2f0 (b + ")
b
+ "; (17)
F0 (c ￿ ") ￿ " = 1 ￿




b0 (0) = ￿
f0 (0) + p0f0
0 (0) ￿ 1
2f0 (0) + p0f0
0 (0)
= ￿1 +
f0 (0) + 1
2f0 (0) + p0f0
0 (0)
:
The least favorable demand Fr is now given by:
Fr (v) ,
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
maxf0;F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g, if v 2 [0;a]
1 ￿
b2f0(b+")
v , if v 2 (a;c)
maxf0;F0 (v ￿ ") ￿ "g, if v 2 [c;1)
1 if v = 1
,
decomposed as Fr = F1 + F2 ￿ F3 where
F1 (v) ,
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
F0 (v ￿ "), if v 2 [0;a]
1 ￿
b2f0(b+")
v + ", if v 2 (a;c)
F0 (v ￿ "); if v 2 [c;1)




0, if v 2 [0;1)
", if v = 1
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F3 (v) , minfF0 (v ￿ ");"g; if v 2 [0;1]:
Lemma 1 can be applied to show that Fr 2 P" (F0): In contrast to the previous case of
p0 > 1
2, now v = 1 maximizes r(Gr;v) so that F2 puts all mass at v = 1: For the case
of p0 = 1
2 Proposition 6 can be used to show that r(Gr;1) = 1 ￿ E[pr] > r(Gr;a) = a.
As in the case where p0 > 1
2; F1 (v) ￿ F0 (v + ") with tangency only at v = b so F1 again
maximizes weight on [a;b). [a;b) is now only a local maximum of r(Gr;v) but nevertheless
it still follows easily that F1 maximizes regret (use the fact that F0 (b + ") < F0 (c ￿ ")). ￿







































Inserting the value for a0 (");b0 (") and c0 (") from (11), (12) and (14) respectively, we obtain




E[pr]j"=0 = ￿1 +
f0 (p0) ￿ 1
2f0 (p0) + p0 (f0)
0 (p0)
:
The same operations yield the result for p0 < 1
2. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Following Proposition 5, lim"!0 a0 (") = ￿1 and lim"!0 c0 (") =
1 and therefore the size of menu is increasing in " for " su¢ ciently small which proves (1).
Next we verify (2). Assume a < v < b. Then x￿ (v) = ln v
a and p￿ (v) =
R v
a y 1
ydy = v ￿ a so
given a0 < 0 for " small we obtain @
@"x￿ (v) > 0; @






(v ￿ a) 1








(v ￿ a) 1





v > 0. Thus, x￿ (v)v ￿ p￿ (v) is strictly increasing in ":
Assume b < v < c. Then x￿ (v) = 1￿ln c
v and p￿ (v) = v￿a+
￿





@"x￿ (v) < 0; @












c (E[pr] + v ￿ c) ￿
￿




1 ￿ ln c
v
￿2 c0 (") < 0Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 30
where we use the fact that c0 (") is large and d
dv
￿1
c (E[pr] + v ￿ c) ￿
￿






























Since incentive compatibility implies that x￿ (v)v ￿ p￿ (v) is continuous in v and since x￿












x￿(b) for v > b holds from above using right continuity of x￿.￿
The following lemma shows how probabilistic prices can be transformed into menus and
vice versa.
Lemma 2 (Equivalence)
1. For any mixed pricing policy ￿(v) the menu (x(v);p(v)) is incentive compatible.
2. If (x(v);p(v)) is incentive compatible, then there exists a mixed pricing policy ￿ such
that ￿ (￿;v) ￿ p(v) for all v 2 [0;1]:







g (s)ds ￿ 0:
Let h be the left hand side of this equation. Clearly, h(0) = 0. Since g is non decreasing and
bounded, h is di⁄erentiable almost everywhere which implies that h0 = 0 almost everywhere.























so h is continuous at v and thus h ￿ 0.
For the rest of the proof we can use a standard result on incentive compatibility, see
Proposition 23.D.2 in Mas-Collel, Whinston & Green (1995). Part (1) follows immediately
from the fact that Fp is nondecreasing and that v￿(v) ￿ ￿ (￿;v) =
R v
0 ￿(s)ds given our
calculations above.Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 31
For part (2), notice that x(v) 2 [0;1] and that incentive compatibility implies that
x(v) is non decreasing and vx(v) ￿ p(v) =
R v
0 x(s)ds. Moreover, we can limit attention
to menus where x is right continuous as otherwise there exists a right continuous incentive
compatible menu (b x(v); b p(v))v2[0;1] such that b p(v) ￿ p(v) for all v: As we consider x that
is right continuous, ￿ such that ￿(v) , x(v) for all v is a well de￿ned mixed pricing
policy and we obtain p(v) = vx(v) ￿
R v
0 x(s)ds. Our calculations above then imply that
￿ (￿;v) = p(v):
Proof of Proposition 8. Assume that b p attains minimax regret but is not robust. So
there exists ￿ > 0 such that for all " > 0 there exists F" such that F" 2 P" (F0) but
￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (b p(F0;");F") ￿ ￿: (18)
Assume that (b p(F0;");G") is a saddle point of the regret problem (SPr) given " > 0. Then




b p(F0;") = p￿ (G"):
We can rewrite the left hand side of (18) as follows:
￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (b p(F0;");F") (19)
= ￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (p￿ (G");G") + ￿ (p￿ (G");G") ￿ ￿ (p￿ (G");F"):
Using (SPr) we also obtain




vdF" (v)+￿ (p￿ (G");F")￿￿ (p￿ (G");G")
so that:





Entering this into (19) we obtain from (18) that:




vdF" (v) ￿ ￿: (20)
Since F";G" 2 P" (F0) and since h(v) = v is a continuous function and the Prohorov norm




vdF" (v) < ￿=2; (21)Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 32
if " is su¢ ciently small.
In the proof of Proposition 3 we showed that ￿ (p￿ (F);F) as a function of F is contin-
uous with respect to the Prohorov neighborhood. Hence
￿ (p￿ (F");F") ￿ ￿ (p￿ (G");G") < ￿=2 (22)
if " is su¢ ciently small. Comparing (20) to (21) and (22) yields the desired contradiction.￿Robust Monopoly Pricing April 10, 2007 33
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Figure 1. Optimal Pricing and Worst Case Demand with Uniform Model Density 
(ε = 0.04)
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